UTOPIANISM IN PSYCHOLOGY: THE CASE OF WILHELM REICH
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This article examines utopian elements in Wilhelm Reich’s writings in his American phase (1939–1957) in order to illustrate utopian sources of dynamic psychology. Although there are scholars who have used the term “psychological utopia” and applied it to individual thinkers (Reich, Marcuse, Fromm) and to specific psychological disciplines (psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology), the term itself has remained elusive and vague. Furthermore, there have been few attempts to systematically examine utopian elements in twentieth-century psychology in general and the basic assumptions of psychological utopianism in particular. While pointing out that Reich’s orgonomic theories have no scientific merit, this article argues for the relevancy of his ideas for understanding the nature of utopianism in dynamic psychology.

The Austrian psychiatrist, one-time psychoanalyst and “orgone biophysicist” Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957) led a tumultuous life and developed a number of ideas that have generally been regarded as controversial and dubious, if not fantastic and insane. During his final, American, phase (1939–1957), Reich abandoned the last vestiges of “normal science” after “discovering” Orgone Energy, which he believed to be the ultimate life force. Thus, he easily appears as an idiosyncratic thinker who created a fantastic pseudo-scientific mythology. However, a historical analysis of his ideas uncovers assumptions and thought patterns that are not unique to Reich but can be found in the theories of other psychologists who incorporated utopian elements in their writings. An analysis of Reich’s theories in his American phase elucidates a psychological mode of thinking that relates the human mind to social realities but interprets this relationship (between self and society) in a way that helps us understand the nature of psychological utopianism.
Reich’s life and work have been the subject of a number of biographies, but his ideas have seldom been examined in a detailed fashion. He is widely regarded as a radical Freudo-Marxist who “preached an apotheosis of the body in all its parts and a worship of the orgasm” (Manuel & Manuel, 1979, p. 793) and under whose system “each individual’s biological urges are to be played out in complete freedom” (Frosh, 1987, p. 149). Following scholars who lay stress on the utopian elements of his Freudo-Marxism, this article will argue that utopianism is not a minor aspect but a characteristic feature of Reich’s work after his Freudo-Marxist period (ca. 1927–1937), during which he was committed to two powerful belief systems, Marxism and psychoanalysis. After giving a short overview of his career in Europe, this article will examine Reich’s theories during his American phase and his shift from ideological (Freudo-Marxist) to utopian thought patterns. Reich, just like C. G. Jung one generation before him, tended toward utopianism only after he was expelled from the psychoanalytic movement in 1934. Accordingly, previous studies of Reich’s purported Freudo-Marxist utopianism are in need of qualification and correction.

FROM THE LIBIDO TO THE ORGONE

Reich studied medicine at the University of Vienna and joined the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1920. In his early psychoanalytic career, he was widely respected as an innovator in the field of psychoanalytic technique. One of his innovations was to suggest setting up a psychoanalytic seminar on technique for younger members of the Society. He assumed the position of chairmanship of the seminar in 1924 and held the leadership until he moved to Berlin in the autumn of 1930. According to psychoanalyst Martin Grotjahn, Reich was the “Prometheus of the younger generation,” who “brought light from the analytic Gods down to us” (1987, pp. 32, 148). Another psychoanalyst, Charles Rycroft, notes that during the 1920s “Reich contributed significantly to the developments in psychoanalysis” (1971, p. 9). Freud himself was obviously quite impressed by the energy, intelligence, and vitality of his young disciple, while Reich found in psychoanalysis a cause worth fighting for.

In 1927, the politically charged atmosphere in Vienna propelled Reich, until then a vaguely left-wing intellectual, into political activity. He became a Marxist and an active member of the Social Democratic party. His great ambition was to unite sexual enlightenment with radical politics, and he tested his new “sex-political” theories by founding the Socialist Society for Sexual Counseling and Sexual Research (Sozialistische Gesellschaft für Sexualberatung und Sexualforschung) in late 1928 and early 1929. As a leader of a (very small) “sex-political movement,” he propagated concrete improvements, such as better housing, legal abortion, and women’s right to divorce their husbands. His move to Berlin gave him ample opportunities to continue both his sex-political and psychoanalytic work with his like-minded colleagues, such as Otto Fenichel, Edith Jacobson, and Erich Fromm.

From the very beginning, Reich was attracted to Freud’s libido theory, and his first psychoanalytic writings dealt with the libido and its significance as a source of energy. In the course of the 1920s, being influenced by Karl Abraham’s concept of a “genital character,”
he developed ideas of the “character structure,” concentrating on the significance of early "genital disturbances" for the later psychological development. From the late 1920s on, Reich, whom his colleagues called “The Character Smasher” (Grojahn, 1987, p. 148), started to distinguish between the "genital character" and the "neurotic character," focusing on the way character structures are shaped in childhood and on the impact of familial constellations on personality development. His characterological work was met with approval and enthusiasm among psychoanalysts, but the reception of his simultaneous work on “orgastic potency” was much cooler. At the same time, his political involvement increasingly irritated both the German Communist party functionaries and Freud, who had little sympathy for Reich’s political activism. What the Communist cadres by and large found both unacceptable and dis- tasteful was Reich’s insistence on the political significance of sexuality and his psychoanalytic interpretations of social issues. Political opposition against Reich culminated in his expulsion from the Danish Communist Party, which he had in fact never joined, in 1933. Moreover, Reich had begun to be perceived as a liability by some of his psychoanalytic colleagues, especially the older members of the Vienna Society. Freud and his inner circle’s opposition against Reich culminated in August 1934 at the International Psychoanalytic Association’s (IPA) conference in Lucerne, Switzerland. There, Reich learned that he had been secretly expelled from the German Psychoanalytic Society in 1933 and that the IPA accepted the expulsion.

For practically all his adult life, Reich had devoted himself to the psychoanalytic cause, and his later commitment to socialism was no less intense. Hence, it would not have been surprising if Reich had been mentally unbalanced after his expulsions from the Communist Party and the IPA. Yet, there is no evidence that this was indeed the case. His first wife, Annie, whom Reich divorced in 1933, and his former friends and colleagues such as Otto Fenichel, Paul Federn, and Sandor Rado circulated the rumor of Reich’s alleged “psychosis.” However, Sandor Rado, who was Reich’s analyst for a few months in Berlin, saw in Reich only a “mild paranoid tendency” in 1931.3 As Benjamin Harris and Adrian Brock argue, “[c]onsidering that Reich was a famous Communist psychoanalyst from a Jewish family in a Germany undergoing Nazification in 1931, ‘mildly paranoid’ suggests mental health rather than disease” (1992, p. 608n). The question of Reich’s sanity was not a minor issue, for the pathologization of his mind perforce had negative effects on his therapeutic and scientific reputation. (For Reich’s own comments on his “insanity,” see Reich, 1974/1967, p.112; Reich, 1973/1933, pp. 526–27.)

In 1934, Reich moved to Oslo, Norway, where he lived for the next five years, becoming more preoccupied with “natural scientific” investigations of the physiological—in contrast to psychological—aspect of the sexual energy. Frustrated by his unsuccessful attempts to convince the Norwegian scientific community about the validity of his new “bion” research and alarmed by the tense political scene in Europe, he immigrated to the United States in August 1939. With his little group of disciples, the most important of whom was Dr. Theodore P. Wolfe (who translated his works into English), he carried on and expanded his biophysical work in New York, financing his activities by his psychotherapeutic work, in which he had less and less interest. In 1939 and 1940, he continued his experiments with “bions,” which he saw as energy vesicles that build a bridge between living and non-living matter. He became convinced that bions could be found in all animate and inanimate nature, including human

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3. In the early 1960s, Rado claimed in an interview that even in the early 1930s Reich was not mildly paranoid but “schizophrenic in the most serious way” (Roazen and Swerdloff, 1995, p. 84). Paul Federn also claimed to detect an “incipient schizophrenia” in Reich in the early 1930s (Federn, 1990, p. 252).
beings. With his theory of bions, he unearthed the old idea of spontaneous generation, and after "observing" through microscope that bions emitted a particular kind of radiation, he "discovered" a new type of energy, first in the so-called sand packets and then in the whole atmosphere (Reich, 1973/1948, p. 14). Reich decided to call this energy "Orgone," deriving the term from the words "organism" and "orgastic" (ibid., p. 30). He came to see Orgone Energy as universal primordial energy working behind all manifest biological energy and penetrating all existing matter. For the rest of his life, he dedicated himself to the investigation of the nature of its functions, including the scientific, social, meteorological, and medical (Orgone Accumulators) ramifications of this all-powerful Life Force. The therapeutic idea behind the Orgone Accumulator box was that it presumably absorbed atmospheric orgone energy, which has beneficial physical and biological effects on human organism.

By "discovering" Orgone Energy, Reich sincerely believed that he had stumbled upon the bioenergetic foundation of humankind, moreover a foundation that was an object not of metaphysical speculation but of natural scientific observation. "The libido discovered by our teacher Freud is now both tangible and measurable as biologically efficacious Orgone Energy," wrote Reich in his 1942 letter to Dr. Hitzsman. He went on to state: "The existence of orgone can be objectively demonstrated" (Reich, 1974/1967, p. 227). He could now see himself as a man who had revealed the "secrets of the nature" (ibid.). By the late 1940s, he believed his research had expanded to universal proportions, for he was studying the putative origin of all matter and energy in living beings and in galactic systems. Reich called this universally existent, all-permeating primordial energy "Cosmic Orgone Energy."

As a self-proclaimed natural scientist, Reich was anxious to become a member of a scientific community and give up his therapeutic work for good (Reich, 1990, p. 106, diary entry for 11 June 1941). Yet, by opposing research on genes and questioning some of the fundamental tenets of modern physics (such as the law of gravitation), he could not find any support for his "findings" among scientists. In particular, his failure to convince Albert Einstein, whom he met in January 1941, increased his agony and frustration, which resulted in his decision to turn his back on the scientific community altogether. Reich believed that if a genius such as Einstein was incapable of understanding him, there was no hope of getting the approval of lesser scientists. Nevertheless, he did send reports of Orgone Energy to the National Research Council, the Committee on Medical Research, American Academy of Sciences, and the Atomic Energy Commission, but failed to arouse those agencies' interest in his research.

In the end, Reich expressed disappointment with his achievements. After the relative success of two international orgonomic conferences, held at his "research center" in Orgonon, Maine, in 1948 and 1950, the modest attempt to institutionalize Reich's work was effectively blocked by a disastrous experiment with nuclear radiation in early 1951. This so-called Oranur experiment was an attempt to demonstrate that Cosmic Orgone Energy could counteract the effects of nuclear radiation. The Oranur experiment not only failed, it nearly cost lives and made further work in Orgonon impossible. At this point, Reich's reputation reached its nadir, and many of his students and assistants left him. In his isolation, his ideas became increasingly

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4. Reich apparently failed to understand what every student of bacteriologist learns: air contains microbes that can contaminate cultures. Instead of accepting this commonplace, he stubbornly clung to the absurd idea that life can be generated from inanimate organic matter. See Reich, 1979/1938 for a book-length study of bions.

5. For example, in his letters to his friend A. S. Neill he repeatedly asked Neill not to propagate his ideas among British scientists. See Reich and Neill, 1982.

6. See The Oranur Experiment (1951, in Reich, 1973), where Reich gives an extensive account of the experiment and its results. Due to the radiation, his wife became seriously ill and had to be operated on. For her account of the events, see I. O. Reich, 1969, pp. 104–110.
fantastic and both his physical and mental health seem to have begun to deteriorate. He had a severe heart attack in October 1951 and, according to his second wife, Ilse Ollendorff Reich, during 1953–1954 he “often drank himself into an absolute stupor” (1969, p. 120).

The building of the Orgone Energy accumulators and their interstate shipment prompted the Food and Drug Agency to investigate Reich’s work in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1954, a federal district court in Maine ordered an injunction preventing Reich and his followers from promoting the use of the Orgone Energy accumulator and, on the basis of misbranding and quackery, ordering the destruction of his books that dealt with the Orgone Energy. Reich did not obey the injunction, and he was sentenced to two years in prison for contempt of court in 1956. The court case against him caused his mental instability to increase even further (Greenfield, 1974). In the mid-1950s, he became preoccupied with UFOs and wondered whether he himself was a spaceman who belonged to a new race on earth. When he died of a massive heart attack in his prison cell in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, in November 1957 at the age of 60, he had only a handful of followers, and he was commonly regarded as a crank, a charlatan, and mentally unbalanced. He had become an intellectual and scientific outsider in every sense of the term.

REICH’S VITALISTIC NATURPHILOSOPHIE

With his conviction of the existence and power of the Orgone Energy, Reich was not a natural scientist but rather a vitalist life philosopher. More than anything, his ideas resemble early nineteenth-century German Romanticism (Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Schelling) and especially Naturphilosophie, philosophy of nature, as inaugurated by Schelling with his seminal *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* (1797) and followed by such authors as Goethe, Lorenz Oken, C. G. Carus, and Eduard von Hartmann. In the German cultural sphere, Naturphilosophie was an early representative of holism in its speculative search for organic unities lying behind the diversification of phenomenal world. Behind the appearance of the mere physical facts of the universe, there hid a grander purpose, the disclosing of which required not natural scientific, but philosophical skills. Philosophy of nature has a long history, going back to Plato and Aristotle, and as a philosophical tradition it lived on through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, assuming new forms. As Harrington (1996) and Ash (1995) have recently demonstrated in their respective studies, it was very typical of (German-speaking) researchers and thinkers of the interwar period to search for “wholeness” in life and science. German holism, in turn, was connected with naturphilosophische and early twentieth-century neo-vitalist issues.8

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8. A. N. Whitehead, Hans Reichenbach, Nicolai Hartmann, and C. F. von Weizsäcker represent twentieth-century philosophy of nature. They were inspired by modern science (quantum physics especially) and philosophy (phenomenology, logical empiricism) and developed philosophy of nature in new directions. Reichenbach, for example, transformed Naturphilosophie into a philosophy of science based on logic and empiricism. Philosophy of nature is a multifarious tradition, and German idealistic Naturphilosophie represents just one, albeit historically important, offshoot of this tradition. See Brel, 2000.

9. According to Beckner (1967, p. 254), vitalism “holds, first, that in every living organism there is an entity that is not exhaustively composed of inanimate parts and, second, that the activities characteristic of living organisms are due in some sense to the activities of this entity.” In other words, vitalists suggested that there is an inherent developmental disposition in the regulatory processes of the organism, which can only function through a complex of “self-activities.”
In his unyieldingly obstinate quest for an underlying unity, Reich represented a form of holistic thinking that wanted to do away with all the complexities, contradictions, and uncertainties of the phenomenal world. As he pointed out in 1949, “[s]ince everything in nature is interconnected in one way or another, the subject of ‘organismic functionalism’ is practically inexhaustible” (Reich, 1973/1949, p. 8). This belief in the interconnectedness of “everything in nature” is naturphilosophische through and through, for it emphasizes interdependencies and the functional unity of organisms. In his search for totality and wholeness, which pervaded German holistic thinking, Reich discredited all but Theories of All, as it were: if a theory gave an account of only a fragment of Life, it was useless for Reich. With good reason, Charles Rycroft calls the system of ideas that Reich developed in his later years as “philosophy of life, a Weltanschauung, perhaps even a cosmology or theology” (1971, p. 79. See also Mann and Hoffmann, 1980, pp. 181ff).

Paradoxically, although Reich tried hard to remove all philosophical speculations from his “natural scientific” investigations of living organisms, he inadvertently joined forces with early twentieth-century neo-vitalists such as Hans Driesch and Henri Bergson and became a natural philosopher with grandiose, utopian ambitions. In his early career, Reich was influenced by Bergson’s philosophical vitalism, and, as he later recounted, he had fabricated a “natural scientific fantasy” under the influence of Bergson and Richard Semon (an innovative researcher of the function of memory) as early as 1922, when he had proposed a literal reading of Freud’s conception of the “sending out of libido” (Reich, 1973/1942, p. 262). Indeed, underlying Reich’s work from the outset was an uneasy relationship with the speculative vitalist and naturphilosophische doctrines, which he first openly embraced as a young medical student and then, as a psychoanalyst and political psychologist, discarded as non-scientific. Yet, far from disappearing from the Reichian scene, vitalism and Naturphilosophie entered it from the back door and assumed major roles in the 1940s. Thus, Reich’s later utopianism had its philosophical roots in the metaphysical search for the governing principles of Life in nature, which characterized nineteenth-century German Naturphilosophie. Reich himself saw the sixteenth-century Italian philosopher of nature Giordano Bruno as his true predecessor, for Bruno, who was burned to death as a heretic by the Roman Inquisition, was a “functionalist” who had anticipated “some basic orgonomic thoughts” (Reich, 1974/1953, pp. 103–09). In Reich’s vocabulary, what is “functional” is close to “natural,” and a functionalist is therefore someone who is in immediate contact with both inner nature and external nature (Reich, 1973/1949, pp. 11 – 12).

What was original and new in Reich’s naturphilosophische speculations about the vitalistic Life Force (Lebenskraft), as compared with earlier philosophers of nature, was that he insisted on the tangible, observable qualities of this Life Force and presented his conjectures regarding the subjective emotional life and, later, cosmic primordial energy as scientific discoveries. In 1945, he wrote that while Freudian id, Aristotelian and Drieschian entelechy, Bergsonian élan vital, and his own orgone describe the same thing (which in fact was not true), his concept fundamentally differed from these other concepts in that it was not merely an expression of “human intuitions of the existence of such an energy,” but “a visible, measurable, and applicable energy of a cosmic nature” (Reich, 1973/1933, p. 297n). Consequently, Reichian “orgonomy,” far from being just a branch of natural science, or a particular psychology or biology, was “a body of knowledge which deals with the basic law of nature” (Reich, 1973, p. 426).

In the late 1940s, Reich became increasingly preoccupied with religion. In The Murder of Christ (1953), his most explicit elaboration on this theme, he acknowledged that orgonomy was “basically not in disagreement with religious thought” (Reich, 1974/1953, p. 200). He
identified God with Cosmic Orgone Energy and himself with Christ, who was a “genital character” and as such symbolized an “unarmored life.” In his orgonomic eschatology, he envisaged the Orgone Energy as the principal means of salvation, as something equivalent to the divine spark of the Gnostics or God’s grace, which would bring about a “majestic conquest of DOR [Deadly Orgone Energy] by OR [orgone] energy, as if what is dead should be declared dead and eliminated from the process of living, seething life” (Reich, 1973, p. 466). He saw nature in terms of animate forces and regarded nuclear energy (NR) as a secondary, evil natural function. After his dangerous experiment with nuclear radiation in 1951 (the so-called Oranur experiment), he had the impression that he and his co-workers had “somehow provoked the otherwise benign OR energy and turned it into a wild beast” (ibid., p. 427). It was as if they had provoked the wrath of God by trying to manipulate primordial, divine cosmic energy.

With his orgonomic functionalism, Reich was both transgressing the boundaries between the known and the unknown and dividing the world into black and white. He tried to put order in the world through a long list of binary categories: the principle of life vs. emotional plague; primary drives vs. secondary drives; orgastic potency vs. orgastic impotence; functional vs. mechanistic-mystical thinking; unarmored vs. armored personality structure; bions vs. T [Tod]-bacilli; true nature vs. second nature; genital sex vs. sexual repression; genital embrace vs. sexual performance; matriarchy vs. patriarchy; work democracy vs. politics; Orgone Energy vs. Deadly Orgone Energy (DOR); laughter vs. giggle. Reich subsumed all phenomena under these binary categories, thereby disregarding the complexities and contingencies of any reality that refused to be categorized simplistically into good and bad. As psychiatrist Anthony Storr has succinctly put it, “[i]n an impossibly complex universe, we long for simplicity, for a world divided into black and white” (1991, p. 137). Reich’s was a view that saw not only human nature but the whole of the universe as radically divided against itself, and, in his quest for a new social and cosmic order, he created a whole cosmological ontology, which culminated in the utopia of “natural” living.

Indeed, during the last two decades of his life, Reich was not only a philosopher of nature and an explorer in the holistic realm of the Orgone Energy, but also a utopian. His life and work was guided by a strong vision of a better life that would come about if humans could be restructured so as to make their original unspoiled “inner nature” free from the shackles of pathogenic culture. Instead of placing his ideal society in a future socialist society, as he did in his Freudo-Marxist years, he now tacitly assumed that only in a liberal-democratic society such as the United States could the human animal be brought into harmony again with his or her natural constitution and the surrounding social environment.

**Psychological Utopianism**

The term “psychological utopianism” refers here to a form of utopian thought in which the attainment of an ideal state of consciousness requires the employment of psychological insights and methods that are effective in transforming human personality and, thereby, the

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70. His second wife, Ilse Ollendorff Reich, writes in her biography of Reich: “In his later years, he undoubtedly began to identify more and more with Christ whose true message, he thought, was distorted by his disciples, and he feared that the same would happen to his work” (I.O. Reich, 1969, p. xxi).

71. By “armor,” Reich referred to the “total defense apparatus of the organism, consisting of the rigidities of the character and the chronic spasms of the musculature, which functions essentially as a defense against the breakthrough of the emotions—primarily anxiety, rage, and sexual excitation” (Reich, 1973/1953, p. xxi). “Dearmoring” would thus mean breaking down this more or less pathological-defense mechanism or “social self.”
whole society or culture. This means that those who propound psychological utopias have both a definite view of the human psyche and a vision of a world that would offer an ideal matrix for psychological well-being. Authors who display utopian propensities do not have to be psychologists themselves, but they must have either adopted — and possibly modified — some particular theoretical conception of the psyche already in existence, or developed their own conceptual framework for explaining the mind. Most European psychoutopian authors were psychiatrists and psychoanalysts (C. G. Jung, Otto Gross, and Wilhelm Reich were psychiatrists by education and training; Erich Fromm was a social scientist who became a lay analyst), but there were also philosophers (Herbert Marcuse) and writers (D. H. Lawrence) among them. Hence psychoutopianism should not be associated with only one particular group of thinkers (such as Freudo-Marxists). What is safe to say is that there are distinct psychoutopian elements in the writings of “dynamic psychologists,” who worked as Freudian, Jungian, or Adlerian analysts or who derived inspiration from (usually one of) these founding fathers of dynamic psychology.

As J. G. Morawski has demonstrated in her study of the “all but forgotten utopias” of G. Stanley Hall, William McDougall, Hugo Münsterberg, and John B. Watson (1982, p. 1082), utopianism is discernible also in American psychology. In fact, the only psychologist who is included in recent anthologies of utopias (Carey, 1999, Claeyts and Sargent, 1999) is B. F. Skinner, whose Walden Two (1948) has attained a status of modern classic in utopian literature. In contrast to the aforementioned American psychologists, European dynamic psychologists did not write utopian fiction and hence one looks in vain for concrete descriptions of an ideal society in their writings. For this reason, the term “utopianism” is more applicable to dynamic psychologists than “utopia.” Utopianism refers to “social dreaming” and expresses quasi-eternal truths about the human condition, whereas utopia denotes a “non-existent society described in detail and normally located in time and place” (Claeyts and Sargent, 1999, p. 1). Authors such as Reich, Jung, Fromm, and Gross incorporated utopian elements in their writings without offering complete utopian blueprints.

The basic characteristic of utopia is that it aims to transform not only some particular aspect of society, but also its fundamental structures and human social relationships. Thus, utopian authors are engaged in a “thought experiment” in which alternative images of human life are presented and new principles of social organisation are propounded. These images and principles offer a positive alternative to prevailing reality and stress the necessity of a massive reorientation of human values. Everyone holds the same values in utopian societies, and in this sense there are no dissidents in utopia: if, for some reason, there are people in utopia who fail to internalize the true values, they are perceived as deviant individuals who must be either re-educated or excluded from society. Most utopias do not resemble pluralist liberal-democratic societies in which different ideologies and values can freely contend. In fact, there is no need for value pluralism in a society in which there exists a harmony of interests and values (for this reason, it is difficult to find utopian elements in Freud, who emphasized the inevitable conflict between individual strivings and social demands). In utopia, values are objective, knowable to all and valid everywhere. In its all-encompassing vision and its self-referential character, utopia can be seen as presenting a “Second Reality,” a closed system that can be exciting and inspiring but also more dogmatic and oppressive than the society to which it aspires to supply an alternative. In this context, the term “reality” is used

12. In addition to B. F. Skinner, there is another post-Second World War American psychologist who manifested utopian propensities: Abraham Maslow, who coined the term “eupsychia” to refer to the good state of consciousness.
as Jürgen Habermas has defined it, that is, as the “totality of objects of possible descriptions” (1999, p. 418).

**Utopianism in Psychology**

I would suggest that there are four basic assumptions regarding the relationship between self and society that characterize utopianism in the psychodynamic tradition. First, psychodynamic authors emphasize the social and cultural significance of an “inner transformation.” According to this anthropological assumption, humans can only liberate themselves socially through the liberation of their inner selves, and a transformation of personality is therefore a prerequisite for the transformation of society. Second, psychoutopians argue for an interconnection between the structure of personality and the structure of society. If there is a reciprocal link between these two distinct structures, so it is argued, then we could in principle change society by changing the structure of personality, provided that we have discovered the social and psychological determinants that constitute this link. Third, psychoutopians claim that individual psychopathologies reflect the pathogenicity of society. This claim is based on an anthropological or holistic conception of illness, according to which a whole society can be healed by restoring the health of single individuals who are psychically disturbed or in a state of “inauthenticity.” Fourth, much of psychodynamic utopianism is characterised by an antagonistic if not outright hostile attitude toward history and “profane time.” While all utopias are transcendent in the sense that they look far beyond the confines of the given social reality, psychoutopianism signified a profoundly antihistorical perspective on questions regarding the basic constituents of human life and the improvement of the human condition.

In Reich’s thinking, we can see all these psychoutopian assumptions. First of all, he certainly had faith in the possibility of inner transformation, for the whole *raison d’etre* of his work was founded on the utopian belief that the discordance between the opposing forces of (inner) nature and culture could be reconciled and brought into harmony. As a means to achieve this ultimate goal, he suggested a “restructuring” of the human psyche and an ensuing personality transformation, which he regarded as the necessary prerequisite for the thorough transformation of society. At the center of Reich’s utopianism was the idea that complete (genital) restructuring must be the goal of the future pioneers of society. Such a restructuring would presumably lead to a “re-establishment of the unarmored, natural state (‘paradise’),” which would signify the freedom of the human organism from “rigidity, dullness, immobility and the rest of the biophysical straitjacket” (Reich, 1983, p. 18). As he wrote in *The Oranur Experiment* (1951), his belief in this particular “dearmoring” or authentification of personality structure was based on the existence of “forward-looking forces that are at work everywhere in the world.” Manifesting the utopian principles of hope, desire, and renewal, he went on to proclaim: “Only a very few responsible people are fully aware today that an old, tired, bound-up world is breaking down, and that a new, hopeful, young world is slowly and painfully being born. The current biosexual revolution, which has been in progress for the past thirty years, constitutes its core” (Reich, 1973, p. 428, emphasis in original).

Reich contrasted the “genital character,” manifesting authentic inner nature, with the “neurotic character.” He considered the suppression of inner nature to be the prime etiological factor in the formation of the neurotic character. He conceptualized the inner transformation in his Freudo-Marxist years in political terms (as an emergence of the Revolutionary Personality) and then, from the early 1940s onward, in biophysical terms (as an emergence of the Functional Personality). His utopian exhortation of the unspoiled, inner nature had distinct
Rousseauian and anthropological elements in it. He was inspired by the Rousseauian idea that social injustices and inequalities are the result of cultural evolution gone astray. In a Rousseauian fashion, he believed that if humans succeed in peeling off the layers of pathogenic culture within themselves (this is what he called “dearmoring”), they will find the original unspoiled source of good and thus open a way to reconstruct a more just and humane society. He was also influenced by his friend Malinowski’s anthropological fieldwork in the Trobriand Islands and by the ideas of “original matriarchy” put forward by such nineteenth-century authors as Engels, Morgan, and Bachofen. According to Reich’s interpretation of their writings, there was no conflict between individual and social regulation of sexuality in the primordial primitive society (Urgesellschaft). On the contrary, the imaginary “primitives” lived in sexual harmony, which was shattered only after the rise of a pathological, patriarchal social order in the distant past (Reich, 1972/1932).

In the mythical matriarchal society, humans lived in a paradise, but with the emergence of patriarchal “mechano-mystical” civilization the God-like human qualities were presumably drowned out and the ensuing change from good to bad resulted in the structural armoring of personality. Consequently, so-called civilized humanity experienced biological degeneration as the free display of primary, naturally inborn drives gave way to the domination of secondary, perverted, evil drives (Reich, 1974/1953, p. 97). By means of functional thinking and research, however, the “blocking of natural contact with the self and the surrounding world will slowly . . . as the prevention of armoring in the newborn generations succeeds . . . completely vanish from the surface of this earth” (Reich, 1973/1951, p. 298). Reich conjectured that the ultimate outcome of this beneficial process will be the re-establishment of the unity of culture and nature and the appearance of a “new type of Man,” which is concomitant with the passing of the age of mechanism and mysticism to the functional cosmic age (Reich, 1951, p. 116): Paradise lost and regained.

The second assumption of psychological utopias, that there is an interconnection between the structure of personality and the structure of society, was of primary importance to Reich. Again and again he propounded the idea that an anchoring of the social order in the character structure explains the psychology of the “masses” and that this anchoring occurs at an early age, after which it is very difficult to “restructure” the human personality in a way that would have social repercussions (see, e.g. Reich, 1972/1933). Reich adopted the doctrine of infant determinism during his psychoanalytic years and, far from abandoning this doctrine in his post-Freudian career, he became even more extreme in his belief in the idea that very early experiences have a lasting effect on later personality development. Thus, he put his faith in newborn babies, who could create a saner world in adulthood if they were brought up in accordance with “sex-economic” principles, such as self-regulation and expressive fulfillment. For this purpose, Reich established an Orgonomic Infant Research Center in 1945. But as in the case of his sexual-political “movement” in the late 1920s in Vienna and early 1930s in Berlin, this “center” had a grandiose name but little affect on the outside world, although a small nursery school founded by one of his students contributed some empirical material to his center.

Recently, developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan has argued that one of the main reasons why so many people have believed and continue to believe in the preservation of early mental structures is that “it is easier to state a cause–effect sequence if each new quality is preceded by one that makes a substantial contribution than if a new behavior suddenly emerges because of a traumatic event or maturational changes in the brain” (Kagan, 1998, p. 5). This presumption requires that past and present are connected in a straightforward fashion, but both empirical studies in developmental psychology and new discoveries in genetics...
seriously question the premise of infant determinists, who minimize the role of chance (Kagan, 1998, pp. 86–87). In the case of Reich, it is apparent that his theories rested on certain assumptions, which enabled him to argue for “rigorous” causal links between very early childhood experiences and the character structure of the adult on one hand and between social structures and character structure on the other. After all, Reich was by his own definition a natural scientist, and as such he was unwilling to relate his theories to contingent chance-factors that were not able to function as law-like determinants.

The third basic assumption of psychological utopias, an anthropological conception of illness, is closely related to the two previous assumptions. Small wonder, then, that Reich propagated this conception and argued that because social factors played a major role in the etiology of mental disturbances, it was necessary to analyze social determinants and promote appropriate social changes that would presumably alleviate such mental problems as neurosis. This task was formidable, for Reich estimated that as many as 90% of all women and about 70 to 80% of all men were sick (Reich, 1974/1967, p. 77). For the later Reich, virtually the whole of humanity was “biologically sick,” and this sickness manifested itself in “fear of freedom.” However, thanks to “healers” such as Reich, “thousands of years of human suppression were in the process of being eliminated” (Reich, 1972/1933, p. 322) and the knowledge of life energy would bring about a “new religion of life” (Reich, 1999, p. 360, diary entry for 1 December 1946).

A precondition for the belief in an anthropological conception of illness is that if one ventures to make a diagnosis of the true mental state of the “masses,” one has to be able to see through the “character armor” or at least to postulate on the “essence” of inner nature. And indeed, most psychoutopians asserted that they were able to see the “hidden self.” This assertion can be traced back to Nietzsche’s questioning of the authenticity of human ideals, which appeared in his writings in the form of entlarvende Psychologie, the psychology of unmasking. Nietzsche was perhaps the first thinker who purported to discern the “true motivations” and drives hidden behind the facade of ego consciousness, to see “what we truly are.” As a Nietzschean entlarvende psychologist, Reich was a true virtuoso. Beside being the subject of a psychoanalytic unmasking (which “showed” that he was mentally unbalanced), he was far from reluctant to apply diagnostic labels to his foes and opponents, and—in later in his life—to all the “Little Men” who could only dream of such utopian qualities as “full orgasmic potency” (Reich, 1974/1948). Quite remarkably, Reich claimed that his “depth psychology” was able to disclose “biologic motives behind psychic phenomena” (Reich, 1972/1933, p. 373) and to demonstrate that “most psychoanalysts were genetically disturbed” (Reich, 1973/1949, pp. 85–86). As befits a man who sees through the masks of others and knows the true motivations of people, Reich was implying that he possessed knowledge that others (e.g., “rigidly armored scientists”) lacked. Thus, he was able to assert, first, that the average person “fears nothing so much as the knowledge of his biological nature,” and, second, that at the same time the average person’s “greatest longing is for the fulfillment of his biological nature” (Reich, 1973/1949, pp. xxii). As for his explanation of his claim that “mechanistic” physicists were incapable of observing Orgone Energy, Reich argued that it was because their armored character structure made them afraid of autonomic organ sensations (Reich, 1973/1949, pp. 85–86). As befits a man who sees through the masks of others and knows the true motivations of people, Reich was implying that he possessed knowledge that others (e.g., “rigidly armored scientists”) lacked. Thus, he was able to assert, first, that the average person “fears nothing so much as the knowledge of his biological nature,” and, second, that at the same time the average person’s “greatest longing is for the fulfillment of his biological nature” (Reich, 1973/1949, pp. xxii). According to Reichian “natural law,” to the extent we can fulfill our biological inner nature, we can lead an authentic life and become “genital characters.” When Reich set this utopian ideal type against the “neurotic” and “armoured” personality structure, he gave a normative account of the difference between “is” (fact) and “ought” (value) and claimed to be in possession of “objectively” true values.

Fourth, and last, the prevailing psychoutopian attitude of antagonism towards historical
time is what clearly distinguishes Reich’s later utopianism from his earlier work as a political psychologist. As a Marxist political psychologist in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Reich had had faith in history, for the Russian Revolution of 1917 had apparently demonstrated that humans can invent themselves—that they can both make their history and be aware of the future implications of their acts. The hidden face of history was supposedly revealed in the Revolution, and this intensified the Marxist deification of history. It was history alone that could lead humanity into freedom. By contrast, utopianism entails the idea that we cannot rely on history for salvation. Instead, we must envision a radical alternative to the prevailing order without pausing to think whether this alternative is grounded on any existing realities. History in the sense of change or rupture could actually cease to exist in a utopia, for in an ideal society historical change would only mean a change for the worse. This utopian transcendence of historical time is apparent in Reich’s “orgonomic functionalism,” which centers around the transhistorical universal Orgone Energy that acts like the Aristotelian unmovable mover: It sets the world in motion without being itself affected by this motion (e.g., historical change). Reich’s vision of the “harmony of natural events” (Reich, 1990, p. 1) looked beyond conflicts, compromises, and frustrations that (in the modern view) constitute human history. Still, as Cosimo Quarta argues, in human aspirations to attain the unattainable, utopia functions as history’s motive force, as the project of history. Hence, the “end of history” would mean the “end of utopia” because “there can be no history without projects” (Quarta, 1996, pp. 163–164). History and utopia are thus interrelated, although utopian attitude to historical time is fundamentally negative: Utopia seeks emancipation from the tyranny of time, which stimulates pathological symptoms.

One thing retained its principal role in Reich’s later bioenergetic system and functioned as the prime manifestation of the timeless Orgone Energy in history: genital sexuality. For Reich, sexuality was both il primo motore, the driving force in history, and ens realissimum, the most real of all being. When Reich observed post–World War II American society, he noticed that a (bio)sexual revolution was going on around him. Such a revolution in the sexual sphere could, he believed, actualize utopian potentials because an individual’s bioenergetic (i.e., natural) and social (i.e., cultural) life would no longer oppose each other but would instead “support, supplement, and enhance each other” (Reich, 1974/1953, p. 8). The main difference between Reich the psychoanalyst and Reich the biophysicist was that from the early 1940s onward he saw sexuality as manifesting not only biological, but also cosmic energy. Yet, it would be quite foolish to claim that Reich was an apostle of uninhibited sexuality, for he was surprisingly puritan in sexual matters. Far from being an advocate of sexual debauchery, he (like most utopians) was rather a moral crusader, making clear distinctions between good (healthy) and bad (perverse) sexuality. He despised instructions on “sexual technique,” disliked homosexuality and other “non-natural” forms of sexual behavior and considered a search for a quick and easy sexual gratification detrimental to the human community (1974/1953, p. 188). He lamented the fact that his sex-economy was regarded by some “fools” as a doctrine of sexual orgy and noted in a tone of frustration: “I have no control over the many perverts and sadists who read my books and pass off their dirty fantasies as my doctrine” (1973/1949, p. 73). For Reich, sexual harmony did not mean sexual debauchery, and sexual emancipation was not an end in itself but part of a biological revolution that

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13. For an insightful analysis of the Communist cult of history in the twentieth century, see Furet, 1999/1997.
14. In a letter to Nic Hoel, Reich remarked: "The sex-hungry people around me tend, in a mystical way, to expect me to create a paradise on earth" (1999, p. 292, 28 June 1943).
would not only bring individuals closer to their genitals, but also, more importantly, closer to their inner truth.

Reich himself was well aware that he had been “accused” of being a prophet of a better orgasm and an unrealistic utopian. In the 1930s, he not only denied being a utopian but also explicitly maintained that utopias were harmful (see, e.g., Reich, 1997, p. 45). In order to see these statements in a proper context, two qualifications must be entered. First, his depreciatory statements about utopias undoubtedly reflected the predominantly negative attitude toward utopianism that was prevalent in European intellectual culture in the first half of the twentieth century. Second, during the 1940s and 1950s, when the utopian elements in his thinking were much more pronounced than in the previous two decades, he did not touch on the issue of utopianism in his writings anymore. Arguably, for Reich, utopianism was too close to the bone, as it were; he did not want to make explicit any possible links between utopianism and his orgonomic science because it would have further undermined his scientific credibility.

What is beyond dispute is that Reich displayed both utopian and anti-utopian sentiments, or, rather, as he lost his faith in history as salvation. There did not exist any ideological safety net for him to fall back on in those troubled moments when his utopian mentality could not guard him against doubt and self-doubt. In times of doubt, he could observe that widespread mental diseases would continue to have destructive effects on society and human life as long as the contradiction between nature and culture remained intact (Reich, 1999, p. 61). In times of self-doubt, he was ready to admit (in a letter to A. S. Neill in 1947) that one of his disciple’s “idea of saving the world with 500,000 [Reichian] vegeto-therapists is a completely illusionary one... the presently living generation cannot be restructured. Only the misdeeds of the emotional pest can be limited and damned in” (Reich & Neill, 1982, p. 186). What strikes the reader of Reich’s recently published diaries and letters from 1934–1947 (1997, 1999) is how often he expressed self-pity and lamented over his feeling of loneliness. His immigration to New York in 1939 and the accelerating world war intensified his melancholy mood. He wrote his former lover Elsa Lindenberg in 1940 that his “old love for mankind has gone” (Reich, 1999, p. 39) and, a year later, he noted in his diary: “Who is supposed to save them [people] anyway? No one is capable of that! Whoever promises to save them will be their downfall. Either people will learn to be responsible adults or they will continue to be slaughtered like sheep by the millions—and rightly so” (ibid., p. 81, 21 February 1941).

Reich was not propagating doctrines of instant salvation, and he emphatically denied that orgone biophysics had anything to do with “redemption” (ibid., pp. 343 – 344, diary entry for 23 July 1946). Yet, he also had dreams of the unity of all nations, of love becoming the only religion, and of Orgone Energy enabling us to “visit distant stars and to contact other beings” (ibid., p. 167, diary entry for 20 December 1942). Despite his temporary bouts of depression and self-doubt, he fully devoted himself to his work. He found consolation in his conviction that he was at the beginning of understanding life and that he had achieved much more than his contemporaries (ibid., pp. 99, 122, diary entries for 22 May and 18 October 1941). In his diary entry for July 12, 1940, he wrote: “Have I discovered the Basic Law of Nature? Or am I just a dreamer? No, I cannot deny the phenomena. They exist” (ibid., p. 30). In the end, his confidence in the crucial importance of his work was much stronger than his temporary feelings of uncertainty and doubt. His enthusiasm was not defeated by chronological time that was inimical to timelessness of utopianism.

15. See Kumar, 1987, for a discussion of the widespread negative attitude toward utopias in the first decades of the twentieth century.
Yet, it seems that Reich never recovered from the catastrophal Oranur Experiment in 1951. In October 1952, when psychoanalyst Kurt Eissler had told him that his former psychoanalytic colleagues and pupils from Europe, now living in New York, had only a peripheral interest in his work, Reich said in a mood of resignation: “Nobody is interested. They can’t be interested. The protoplasm doesn’t sparkle any more” (Reich, 1974/1967, p. 119). It was as if it had dawned upon Reich that his utopia was destined to remain his own personal vision, shared by no one but a small core of loyal disciples who were not in a position to make his dream come true. For a man with so many original ideas, it must have been tragic to accept that, in the end, the protoplasm didn’t sparkle anymore. The utopian energies had been exhausted.

**CONCLUSION: REALITY AND SECOND REALITY**

When Reich was a student, he wrote in his diary entry for August 1, 1920, that “[m]y life, my actions, are dominated by one idea: reality is dirty” (Reich, 1988, p. 119). Indeed, in true utopian style, Reich was dissatisfied with the prevailing reality and, as he grew older, his urge to save humankind by envisaging the Second Reality of expressive fulfillment became more and more apparent. Like most psychoutopians (such as Jung, Gross, and Skinner), Reich was inclined to disregard historical reality in favor of a “Second Reality,” which he tacitly assumed to be closer to the “Truth,” or even to represent the “Absolute Truth” itself. Reich’s Second Reality was a transcendental, higher reality, which was “beyond” history, but accessible to those who were unarmored and thus “rational” enough to see the Bio-Energetic Truth behind lesser truths. This allegedly “non-mystic” form of functional knowledge that Reich advocated was not so much an epistemological as a mystical category, for the proper method to achieve Reichian knowledge required something like an intuitive sensitivity to orgonomic reality beyond mundane, profane reality. In his published writings, Reich never expressed doubts about the validity of his own theories, nor reflected upon the possibility that his belief system could, in principle, contain errors and inadequacies. This was contrary to a scientific attitude, which tolerates and even generates conflicting views. As physiologist and cancer researcher Theodore Hauschka puts it, “functional thinking a` la Reich is wishful thinking so intense that one’s experiments always corroborate one’s intuitions” (n.d., p. 4/288 E).

In Reich’s orgonomic functionalism, there are even more idiosyncratic terms than in Heidegger’s philosophy. This is so because he created his own language to articulate the orgonomic law of motion. His notions of Orgone Energy, the functional unity of life, and character armor stand at the very limits of representation. Rather than concepts, they were what Rudolf Otto called “ideograms,” non-rational linguistic frameworks for signifying the boundaries of the known and the unknown (Otto, 1923/1917). Reich claimed to see what others did not see, and, in his insistence on the validity of those cosmic laws that he had “discovered,” he invented a new vocabulary, which became increasingly idiosyncratic and self-referential during the last decade of his life. One of the reasons his vocabulary changed over time is that every time he made a new “discovery” in nature, he modified the conceptual framework of his anthropology accordingly. Thus, during his microscopic studies of the life of protozoa and amoeba in the mid-1930s, he asserted that in human organisms there is a wish to become spherical and that this wish becomes acute in orgasm (Reich, 1982, pp. 40–41). Twenty years later, after making observations of desert life (in conjunction with his attempt to make rain with his Cloudbuster) he made comparisons between the desert and life in armored people and characterized human life as if he was describing the life of the desert.
As he noted in 1952, “[w]e are translating old, well-known psychological and bioenergetic terms into more fundamental physical terms” (Reich, 1973, p. 462). The point in Reich’s physical reductionism was that he did not subsume biological and psychological terms under any known physicalistic language but invented his own language, which was hard to reconcile with the scientific language of contemporary physics, chemistry, and biology. Therefore, with his idiosyncratic vocabulary, Reich made it exceedingly difficult for natural scientists to take him seriously.

It is quite evident that Reich’s bioenergetic theories have no scientific merit. If this were all that there is to conclude, it would hardly make it worthwhile to devote a whole article to his ergonomic theories. However, the fundamental thesis of this article is quite different: While pointing out that Reich’s theories have no scientific value, this article has also argued for the relevancy of his ideas for understanding the nature of (psycho)utopian thought. Although there are scholars who have used the term “psychological utopia” and applied it to individual thinkers (Reich, Marcuse, Fromm) as well as to specific psychological disciplines (psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology), the term itself has remained elusive and vague. Furthermore, there have been few attempts to systematically examine utopian elements in twentieth-century psychology. For Manuel and Manuel (1979), “psychological utopia” refers to a “good state of consciousness” while for clinical psychologist Michael W. Barclay (1993), utopianism manifests itself negatively as an impulse toward totalizing explanations in behaviorism and cognitive psychology. Psychoanalyst Emanuel Berman proposes in turn that the “proneness of psychoanalysts and psychotherapists to develop utopian visions stem from a central ingredient in the unconscious motivation to become an analyst or a therapist in the first place: namely, from our rescue fantasy” (Berman, 1993, p. 45). While all these perspectives illustrate one particular aspect of psychoutopianism, they fail to address the very idea of the role and function of utopianism in psychology.

This article suggests that there are elements of utopianism in a form of psychodynamic thinking that found inspiration in Freudian psychoanalysis but also went beyond the analytic attitude of Freud. It further suggests that by abandoning or revising psychoanalytic theory, some psychodynamic thinkers replaced ideological elements with utopian elements. In particular, this shift from psychoideology to psychoutopianism sheds new light on C. G. Jung’s, Erich Fromm’s, Otto Gross’, and Wilhelm Reich’s theories. What is meant by this shift is the following: ideologies are concerned with explaining the purported “laws” of history and nature, laws that reveal the course of historical and natural processes. By giving an account of these processes, idealists pretend to be capable of seeing the determinants of human experience. Dismissing the notion of contingency, according to that which exists is neither necessary nor impossible, advocates of ideologies offer absolutes, ultimate explanations of the total structure of reality. The sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim criticized ideologies for three different reasons: first, their function is to “conceal the actual meaning of conduct rather than to reveal it”; second, they resort to the “device of escape from themselves and the world . . . thereby conjuring up false interpretations of experience”; third, they fail

It is worthwhile to note that Reich anticipated not only the sexual revolution of the 1960s but also ecological issues, the pollution of the atmosphere in particular. He was one of the first public figures to express worries about the air pollution, and although his explanations of it were false, he was sensitive to the changes in the atmosphere and made acute observations long before environmental issues became topical. He saw the atmosphere almost as if it was a Higher Being, something that can feel and act upon us. On this issue, see Mann and Hofmann, 1980, pp. 220ff.

For a conceptual analysis of ideology, see Freeden, 1996.
to “take account of the new realities applying to a situation” and instead attempt to conceal these realities by “thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate” (Mannheim, 1960/1936, pp. 84–87).

The political philosopher Hannah Arendt was even more severe in her critique of ideologies, arguing that totalitarian elements are intrinsic in all ideologies and that while claiming to give a total explanation, ideological thinking “becomes independent of all experience from which it cannot learn anything new. . . . Hence ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality that we perceive with our five senses, and insists on ‘truer’ reality concealed behind all perceptible things” (1964/1951, pp. 470–471). In Arendt’s view, there are two basic elements in ideological argumentation: the element of movement and of emancipation from reality and experience. Arendt’s conception of the totalitarian nature of ideologies is applicable to utopianism as well, for neither utopian nor ideological thinking tolerates dissent.

The philosopher of history Eric Voegelin has applied the term “Second Reality” to describe the attempts of ideologies to destroy language “inasmuch as the ideological thinker has lost contact with reality and develops symbols for expressing not reality but his state of alienation from it” (1989, p. 18). Both Voegelin and Arendt see ideologies as a system of ideas in which the standards of thought are corrupted and the reality of experience is replaced by “truer,” higher reality.

While both utopias and ideologies include totalitarian elements and replace reality with a Second Reality, they are fundamentally different in that unlike ideologies, utopias are not oriented toward history and to the question of how something comes to pass. Utopias are concerned not with movement and the historical process, but with the ultimate result of (historical) process. The utopian Second Reality is a transhistorical reality that rejects the contingencies and complexities of historical time and instead seeks the timeless sphere of truth and beauty. Psychoanalysis can be seen as containing ideological rather than utopian elements. What is remarkable about ideologies is that they appear to us as perfectly logical and consistent, provided that we only accept their premise. In the case of psychoanalysis, one unverifiable premise is the claim that unconscious mental life is comprehensible by psychoanalytic methods. Because of the logic inherent in their ideas, political ideologies such as Marxism or Liberalism and psychological ideologies such as psychoanalysis claim to know the determinants of the historical process. The main difference between these two forms of ideologies is that while psychoanalysis has little to say about the laws of history, it is very confident in its ability to explain the objective psychic laws of the individual life history. As the social anthropologist Ernest Gellner noted, both Marxism and psychoanalysis are an “account of the central human predicament, a recipe for its remedy (partial or total), and hence, by implication, a morality” (1993, p. xiii). While using the term “belief system” instead of “ideology,” Gellner manages to analyse those components in psychoanalysis that could as well be called “ideological.”

When Reich broke off with the psychoanalytic movement in 1934, he also broke off with a powerful ideology, which has enjoyed a “privileged access to the psychological processes of human functioning” (Stein, 1972, p. 13). Yet, although all three critics mentioned above (Mannheim, Arendt, and Voegelin) viewed ideologies negatively as ways of misrepresenting reality or replacing it altogether with “truer” reality, Mannheim also underlined the value of both ideologies and utopias. In his view, a total lack of attempts to transcend the prevailing order presents the more or less immutable “reality as such” that cannot be changed through human efforts. From this perspective, we could offer a constructive criticism not only
of Reich’s utopianism, but also of psychoutopianism as a whole. As a utopian, Reich replaced reality with Second Reality and claimed to be in possession of True Values. Yet, he has also apparently inspired people by showing what could be, and, provided that one shares Reich’s view on the importance of social change, this utopian quest for an alternative reality can be seen as an antidote to social stagnation and as a signal that choice, and therefore hope, are still possible.

In the last analysis, there is more to psychoutopianism than a desire for a totallistic explanation, a fulfilment of (healthy) sexual needs or a Messianic urge to rescue humanity. Those psychodynamic thinkers who were inclined toward utopianism (Reich, Jung, Fromm, and Gross) may have been moral crusaders rather than scientific psychologists, and they may have failed in their ambition to see beyond the limits of human understanding. With their fanciful theories and sweeping generalizations, they understandably have become rather marginalized figures in the field of psychology. Nevertheless, their utopianism can command some respect, even if it fails to carry conviction. This is so because the very idea of offering alternative perspectives on reality can have suggestive force, and it seems that even today there are educated people in the world who prefer original insights into human nature and imaginary visions of the good life to cool objectivity and systematic coherence. Manifesting the ambivalence that is typical of thoughtful scholars of utopian thought, Karl Mannheim both criticized and defended utopianism. With all his reservations about the utopian negation of reality, he nevertheless contended that the “complete elimination of reality-transcending elements from our world would lead us to a ‘matter-of-factness’ which ultimately would mean the decay of the human will” (Mannheim, 1960/1936, p. 236). Seen in this Mannheimian light, one can plausibly argue for the necessity of utopianism if the human sciences are not to decline into narrow expertise and sterility.

Many people continue to find inspiration in the writings of Reich, Jung, Fromm, and Gross, regardless of their scientific reputation, because of their utopian propensities. There are undoubtedly also many people who find their ideas nonsensical or even irritating because their observations are so value-laden. When it comes to accepting or rejecting the ideas that psychoutopian authors advocated in the name of science, very much depends on whether the values that they promoted find resonance in us or not. As Max Beerbohm so aptly put it:

So this is Utopia,
Is it? Well —
I beg your pardon;
I thought it was Hell.18


