Seldom does one have the privilege of reviewing work as important and impressive as these volumes. Along with Schore’s earlier work, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self*, these two new collections constitute a trilogy of carefully crafted and researched papers. They also mark “a clarion call for a paradigm shift, both in psychiatry and in biology and in psychoanalytic psychotherapies.” The papers included in the two volumes were published during the past decade with newer material added. One cannot over-emphasize the significance of Schore’s monumental creative labor.

Schore convincingly argues that it is self and personality, rather than consciousness, that are the outstanding issues in neuroscience. The development of self and personality is bound up with affect regulation during the first year of life when the infant is dependent on mother’s auxiliary “self-object,” right-brain-mediated nonconscious “reading” of her infant’s needs and regulatory capacity. Mother both soothes and excites within her infant’s ability to cope without becoming traumatized. In other words, an attuned adaptive “good enough” functioning is essential for right-brain structural-functional development. The self-organization of the developing brain can only occur in the finely attuned relationship with another self, another brain.

According to Schore, Freud’s unconscious and preconscious are right-brain based rather than in the lexical-semantic-motor dominant left hemisphere. The right hemisphere is also critically involved in the maintenance of...
of a coherent, continuous, and unified implicit sense of self. In his words: “Most moment-to-moment psychological processing occurs nonconsciously.” “Rapidly communicated nonconscious social-emotional information is primarily processed and acted on at implicit levels.” “The essential self-regulatory functions that allow us to appraise and adapt to personally meaningful changes in the environment occur largely below Cs awareness” (Schore, 2003 b, p. xv).

Schore refers to the right brain as being capable of “genuine dialogue” based on multiple converging determinants. The right brain is holistic, synthetic, and imagistic. It is capable of adaptation to situations that are “complex, internally contradictory and basically irreducible to an unambiguous context.” This complex information is transferred to the linear verbal left-brain for further processing to conscious mind only once affect is regulated. Around age four, through developing corpus callosum structures, the left lexical brain allows a measure of conscious control over the emotional mind.

Left and right cortical growth spurts alternate and can be correlated with various phases of human development. The infant or child’s brain can make use of crescendos of excitement only if matched by increasing affect tolerance made possible by the internalization of the soothing self-object experiences that eventually become self-regulating. Without adequate provision by the facilitating supplementary environmental maternal “brain,” neurological systems are pruned and lost. “Use it or lose it,” says Schore. This dynamic was already known in relation to visual cortex development.

Schore’s prodigious erudition is illuminating. He draws on interdisciplinary literature from developmental psychology, attachment theory and research, developmental biology, neurobiology, neurochemistry, and developmental neuropsychoanalysis. He is as much at home with systems theory as with “chaos” theory’s nonlinear dynamics, and the energetic “resonance” models of nuclear physics. There are 135 pages of some 25 references per page in these two volumes, and what he quotes is always significant. Two missing references that occur to me but do not in the least detract from Schore’s overall accomplishment are Clyne’s interesting (1977) study of Sentics: A study of the Emotions, and Richard Cytowic’s work on Synaesthe sia (1993). But I am confident that Schore would agree with Cytowic’s conclusion that cognition can be conceived of as but a special form of affect. Schore’s neurobiological literature is no less discerningly sampled. Oliver Sachs’s work has made a great deal of difference to neurology, but Schore’s is perhaps even more revolutionary and
pivotal. I am pleased to steer all my distinguished neurologist friends to these volumes.

It was exciting to explore with Schore the neurobiological bases for the clinically derived observations and hypotheses. One is exposed to a marvellous array of research and applied theoretical lenses all brought to bear on the topics addressed through a systematic systemic array of interconnected hierarchies of interinfluential organizations. From a clinical point of view, it is encouraging that the right orbitofrontal cortical areas remain plastic to development throughout life, allowing for therapeutic change at any age. Modifications in implicit relational knowledge and unconscious internal representation are the major changes in psychotherapy—their physical substrate is in the right brain. Right-brain-located-affect regulation is the final common pathway of effective psychotherapies (Bradley, 2000) and the contemporary traumatic memory processing energy therapies (Mollon, 2005). For a psychoanalyst originally trained in the basic languages of medicine, it is a great treat to be able to become “updated” with four or five decades worth of research enabled by magnificent technical advances that allow researchers to identify which parts of the brain structures are involved in the inter- and intrahuman areas.

As a clinician and devotee of Sutherland, whose influential Philosophy for the Helping Professions (1983) argued that inner and outer worlds influence each other, it is wonderful to be presented with Schore’s array of evidence in support of the interconnectedness of the psychosocial intersubjective realms.

While training as a psychoanalyst in London, I was fortunate to be influenced by John Bowlby and Donald Winnicott (Issroff, Reeves & Hauptman, 2005). What Schore has done is to link the implications of their work to brain hardware. The caretaker, he notes, modulates changes in the child’s energetic state and keeps arousal from becoming hyper or hypo via shame-repair cycles that employ the autonomic nervous system. Schore emphasizes the qualitative way sensitively “good enough” attuned mothering is necessary to support and regulate, and also to dysregulate and then “repair” the infant. As Winnicott noticed, the mother also has to “fail” in doses with which the developing infant can cope. And so does the therapist.

Schore cites evidence that has arisen from Bowlby’s revolutionary and experimentally fertile recasting of psychoanalytic concepts in testable form, and demonstrates how brain development occurs within an attachment-relational perspective leading to health and resilience or to vulnerability, the shattered minds of personality disorders, mental ill health, and later
posttraumatic stress and dissociative identity disorders. He demonstrates in considerable detail how infant and adult maternal-parental disorganized, disoriented attachment problems caused by neglect and abuse lead to defensive dissociation—a view consistent with contemporary interpersonalists like Bromberg who notes that. “Personality disorder can be defined as the characterological outcome of the inordinate use of dissociation” (quoted in Schore, vol 2, p.132).

But Schore does not overlook various Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic and sociopsychic models. He demonstrates the validity of certain Freudian concepts, linking them to particular areas of brain functioning. Schore’s work returns us to early Freud, showing how some of the metaphors and models developed in his 1891 neurological study of dyslexia and 1894 *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, reappear as psychological constructs in later Freud. More than this, drawing prodigiously on voluminous research, he has assembled the details of the way in which they reach to influence the intrapsychic conceptual world at genetic, biochemical, hormonal, and multiorgan response levels.

Schore documents subtle systems of psychosocial affective regulators and dysregulators, from the level of intracellular mitochondrial all the way to the plastic brain structural developmental synaptic system. He identifies regulatory mechanisms within the astrocytal-dendroglial, neurological, and neurohormonal somatic feedback regulatory systems. He notes the contradictory responses of the parasympathetic “freeze” and sympathetic nervous system “fight-flight” responses that occur in conditions of threat and stress and that sometimes in certain puzzling dissociative states can occur simultaneously. He suggests that abuse and neglect have a profound impact on these systems, leading to dissociative defensive processes and hitherto apparently strange physiological reactions.

Although the papers were written over a decade, and themes repeat themselves in different contexts for different purposes, for me the recursive nature of the volumes made for an experience similar to listening to richly complex music such as Bach or late Beethoven. One benefits from revisiting them again and again to familiarise oneself with what one thinks one “knows,” yet one keeps discovering some further moving resonance in each new context. Or, perhaps a better image of the experience of working one’s way through the seventeen hefty chapters in these two volumes is that of looking into a kaleidoscope reassembled into different pictures of beautiful complexity in which one can discern many of the same elements. The repetitiousness is not superfluous, but essential to each paper and chapter.
It is, perhaps, no accident that Schore's work has been compared to Einstein's theory of relativity. His labors are Darwinian in scope and import. Their fruitful implications are akin to Krebs' realization of the energy-releasing cycle that powers our understanding of biochemistry. He has integrated a vast array of information and organized it in an overarching way that deserves our deepest gratitude.

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BEYOND THE DIALECTIC OF RECOGNITION


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Jon Mills is a psychoanalyst and philosopher, president of the Canadian Psychological Association’s Section on Psychoanalysis, and editor of Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies, a book series with Rodopi Press. He has written and edited a number of important psychoanalytic books recently and many of the central ideas contained in these works can be
traced to The Unconscious Abyss. The aim of Mills's book is interdisciplinary: to help psychoanalysts and philosophers alike appreciate Hegel's theory of mind and its ramifications for clinical work. This is an ambitious, scholarly project at which Mills succeeds admirably.

To some readers, the title of this book may not seem inviting. After all, revisionist schools of psychoanalysis, particularly the interpersonal, inter-subjective, and relational, are not generally given to discussing the unconscious at any length. At the same time, some clinicians remain hesitant to jump into the waters of philosophical discourse. What makes Mills’s book stand out is that it helps the psychoanalyst and interested reader understand current debates in psychoanalytic theory and practice in ways that are both clinically relevant and historically illustrative.

Mills’s approach is two-fold. First, to explain how Hegel develops a theory of the unconscious that is central to his entire philosophy. Second, to show the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy to psychoanalysis, both historically and contemporaneously. Since the latter is of more direct relevance to clinicians, I focus primarily on Hegel’s anticipation of psychoanalysis, and on Mill’s own theory of “process psychology.” To begin, however, I want to provide some biographical and philosophical background since Hegel today is no longer a commonly known figure.

The philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is without doubt one of the most influential of the modern era. In contrast to continental Europe, the stature of philosophy as a discipline has suffered decline in contemporary North American society. Whereas Derrida or Habermas are sometimes considered household names in France or Germany, here the influence of individual philosophers is usually limited to the academy. By contrast, in nineteenth century Europe and America alike, philosophy was considered the pinnacle of learning. William James, after all, was both the founder of modern American psychology as well as a philosopher of great renown. Not surprisingly, the impact of Hegel’s ideas on a range of disciplines beyond philosophy is well documented and simply cannot be underestimated.

The son of a revenue officer with the civil service, Hegel at first trained to become a clergyman, and entered the seminary at the University of Tübingen in 1788. There he developed friendships with the poet Friedrich Hölderlin and the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, two of the most famous German intellectuals of the period. Hegel eventually changed course and became a lecturer at the University of Jena, completing his most famous book, The Phenomenology of Mind, in 1807. He
accepted a professorship in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg in 1816 and published in summary form a systematic statement of his entire philosophy entitled *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline* (1817). In 1818 Hegel was invited to teach at the University of Berlin, where he was to remain until his death in Berlin on November 14, 1831, during a cholera epidemic.

Hegel’s aim was nothing less than to set forth a comprehensive philosophical system encompassing the ideas of his predecessors and creating a conceptual framework for achieving a philosophic understanding of the past and future. Indeed, to this day, Hegel is most often connected to grand theories. Not by chance, Hegel conceived the subject matter of philosophy to be reality as a whole. He was interested in no less than the total developmental process of everything that is, which he referred to as the Absolute, or Absolute Spirit. According to Hegel, the task of philosophy is to chart the development of Absolute Spirit.

Hegel is probably best known for his “dialectic.” The dialectical method involves the notion that movement or progress is the result of the conflict of opposites. Eventually these opposites are *Aufgehen* (annulled) in the process of self-development of the Absolute, understood as pure thought, spirit, or mind. For Hegel, reality is understood as the Absolute unfolding dialectically in a process of self-development. In *The Phenomenology of Mind* Hegel traces the stages of this development from the simplest level of consciousness, through self-consciousness, to the advent of reason. At the time of his death, Hegel was arguably the most prominent philosopher not only in Germany, but in Europe and beyond. Hegel’s followers divided religiously and politically into right-wing and left-wing Hegelians. Right-wing Hegelians emphasized the connections between Hegel’s philosophy and Christianity. They contrasted with left-wing Hegelians, including Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Engels, and Karl Marx, who were the atheistic revolutionaries that Western capitalism has so loved to hate. Hegel’s philosophy had a large-scale impact on nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical movements as well, from British idealism to existentialism and phenomenology.

Mills’s book is significant precisely because he demonstrates the indisputable relevance of Hegel’s ideas, not only within the history of philosophy, but for contemporary psychoanalysis. Mills’s discussion of Hegel is in the tradition of earlier psychoanalysts, such as Ludwig Binswanger (1942) and Jacques Lacan (1977) each of whom wrote about Hegel’s importance for intersubjectivity at some length. In postwar Europe, in particular,
Hegel's writings became synonymous with the emergence of French psychoanalytic theory. Mills analysis would have benefited if he had given more space to a discussion of this psychoanalytic tradition. More recently, Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness has been elaborated a number of psychoanalysts (Benjamin, 1988; Modell, 1993; Frie, 1997) as a means for understanding the process and struggle of human self-development.

On a more clinical note, I recently visited with a psychoanalytic colleague from southern Germany, who told me that his psychoanalytic institute offers a well-attended course on Hegel. It is rather hard to imagine anything like that happening in the North American context of psychoanalytic training, which tends to be characterized by clinical professionalism (Quebec being the exception). The Anglo-American emphasis on the learning of technique, though important, is more often than not an obstacle for developing a broader course curriculum. To my knowledge, the only psychoanalysts who regularly talk about and use Hegel are Lacanians, and they remain a subset within the American psychoanalytic community. Given these facts, Mills's efforts are a welcome change.

Mills study shows that the dialectic of self and other, currently of such interest to relational psychoanalysts, is only a small part of Hegel's overall opus. In fact, Mills eclipses general Hegel scholarship by examining Hegel's theory of the unconscious and showing its broader impact for contemporary psychoanalysis. He moves well beyond familiar Hegelian territory of self-other relations to show ways in which the very idea of a psychoanalytic theory of mind is anticipated by Hegel in ways that are at once nuanced and perhaps more balanced than Freud's deterministic approach. This is no small feat, as those readers who have attempted reading Hegel first-hand will attest. Hegel's writing is renowned for its challenging and difficult nature. Mills does an excellent job of elaborating and developing many of Hegel's central ideas, for example: "In common language, spirit is a developmental process of self-actualization, realized individually and collectively through reflective, contemplative thought and action" (p. 5).

Mills tells us that Hegel employed the term unconscious in limited contexts, yet unconscious activity, for Hegel, underlies all dimensions of human subjectivity. This is what he refers to as the abyss; that is to say, the unconscious is not grounded by anything outside of itself. The unconscious is the subjective ground of the most primitive levels of individuality. "This pure or original consciousness, the formal ‘I,’ resides within the realm of the abyss, outside our immediate self-conscious awareness of such activity" (p. 7). This is the realm of primal feeling, that of the feeling of “soul.”
If the language here sounds familiar, it should. Hegel’s use of the notion of unconsciousness was very similar to that of Freud. Yet, these notions do not translate directly into the clinical domain, as they are a part of Hegel’s philosophical system. Still, from the outset Mills does a good job of demonstrating the connections and helping the reader understand their relevance. Most importantly, perhaps, by turning to Hegel, we avoid an essentialistic pitfall reminiscent of Descartes, noting that the unconscious is “pure process, a changing, flexible, and purposeful activity of becoming” (p. 12). The structure and organizing principles of the unconscious are always informed by the movement of the dialectic. Similarly, the structural foundations of the self, which have their origins in the unconscious, are never static or inert, but always in dialectical movement.

Among contemporary psychoanalysts, there is much fascination with the notion of self-states. This stems from a rejection of “the self” as an essentialist, materialistic concept. Yet, those who are critical of any mention of “the self” or “a self” should take heed. As Hegel shows us, “the self” is not a materialistic entity, but a dynamic, continually unfolding process. In this instance, Hegel provides an alternative to the decentering impulse in postmodernist psychoanalysis.

The history of philosophy succinctly demonstrates that few beyond Descartes ever actually believed in the fiction of a unified self. Moreover, talk of self-states always needs to be accompanied with a conception of how these selves remain part of a cohesive and continuous whole that we understand as the self-system. By elaborating Hegel’s understanding of self-development—as a dialectical process of conflict and resolution—Mills provides a means of understanding this important aspect of human experience.

For critics of Hegel, who contend that his model of self-consciousness is circular, Mills provides a spirited defense, drawing on the notion of the unconscious abyss (pp. 135–157). This is a part of popular European philosophical debate that has ramifications for how we understand the nature of self-experience. Perhaps not surprisingly, this section reads much like the debate between Jean-Paul Sartre and Freudian psychoanalysts in the 1950s. Sartre described the notions of the unconscious and repression as circular and self-defeating. Sartre asked how it was possible for a person to consciously forget something that has been repressed if he or she consciously experienced it to begin with? This criticism, though simple, was also trenchant. The difficulty with Sartre’s argument was that it was aimed squarely at Freud’s early dualistic theory of the unconscious, and
did not take into account the ways in which Freud’s later dynamic theory purported that all aspects of our psychic life (id, ego, and superego) are both conscious and unconscious at the same time. Similarly, Hegel’s theory of consciousness and self-development is much more complex than some of his critics actually allow for.

In another, fascinating section on the “Abnormal Spirit” (pp. 159–186), Mills shows the ways in which Hegel was interested in understanding the conditions that inform abnormal psychology. Hegel’s interest in the field of psychopathology was not entirely fortuitous. He suffered from depression, and his close friend at Tübingen, the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, became mentally ill after suffering a nervous breakdown and was later diagnosed with the modern equivalent of schizophrenia. If Hegel’s analysis appears overly formal, it is no doubt a result of the fact that his personal life was filled with suffering and anguish that accompanies the experience of mental illness in oneself and one’s close friends and family.

Mills uses Hegel’s interest in psychopathology and the unconscious to trace the links and parallels to Freud. Although Freud is usually credited with the “discovery” of the unconscious, it is more accurate to say that Freud was the first to develop a systematic theory of the unconscious. Clearly, Hegel’s elaboration of unconscious subjectivity already went a long way to demonstrating the reality of intrapsychic life. Mills develops a sophisticated analysis that illuminates the place of the irrational in mental life. As Mills puts it, “Hegel anticipated the realm, scope, and range of the abyss, while Freud made it more intelligible. While Hegel provided us with a cogent and coherent theory of unconscious subjectivity, Freud greatly advanced our understanding of the powers of the human psyche and the unconscious processes that affect conscious life” (p. 191). The same could, of course, be said of Nietzsche, as much recent scholarship has shown.

Given this description, the obvious question is whether, or to what extent, Freud actually read Hegel. The answer is unclear. But the point may be that even if Freud did not read Hegel directly, Hegel’s influence on thinking at the time was profound, and so many of the ideas Hegel developed would have been known to Freud. Mills concludes that Freud could not have been exposed to Hegel’s concept of madness and the soul, for if he had been, Freud could not have ignored Hegel’s implicit thesis of the primacy of the unconscious.

In the last section (pp. 187–202), Mills traces the implications of his analysis for psychoanalysis. Mills suggests throughout the book and especially in this final chapter that central to Hegel’s overall philosophy is the notion
of “process.” The notion of a process is closely tied to the idea of the dialectic. And indeed, for Mills, Freud’s psychoanalytic paradigm of the mind is thoroughly dialectical. The dynamic interplay between the constituents of psychic life are numerous: id-ego, ego-superego, pleasure principle and reality principle, wish-defense, and primary and secondary process thinking, to name but a few. Similarly, in a useful discussion Mills locates this dialectical tension in the history of psychoanalysis itself, tracing the ongoing evolution of psychoanalysis through a series of tensions from drive to ego psychology, from object relations to self psychology, from interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis to intersubjectivity and postmodernism.

When applied to Hegel’s notion of “process,” the evolution of the dialectic of psychoanalytic thinking and practice “incorporates all possible conditions of psychic reality: the moment of inception of individual unconscious subjectivity, to the cultivated, collective-identificatory aspects of rational, aesthetic, ethical and social self-conscious life.” As such, Mills defines process psychology as “the essence of intrapsychic and intersubjective life insofar that if it were removed, psychic reality would perish” (p. 194).

After completing the final chapter, I wished that Mills had said more about the nature of process psychology and Hegel’s anticipation of psychoanalysis. But, as I indicated at the start of this review, the reader should attend to Mills’s latest works that continue to elaborate his theoretical and clinical ideas. In the final analysis, Mills’s lucid analysis of Hegel’s philosophy challenges the clinician to think in new and unaccustomed ways. And I can hardly think of a better reason to recommend a book.

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Psychoanalysts are well-aware of the tripartite structure of psychoanalytic education: personal analysis, supervision of control cases, and didactic course work. Most analysts would probably be surprised to learn, however, that at the same Budapest conference where Freud adumbrated this structure in the fall of 1918, he also made a commitment to clinics that would be under the same umbrella if not actual roof of the various psychoanalytic institutes. Furthermore, the clinics were to be supported financially by their respective institutes; patients would be seen on a sliding scale, ranging as low as zero. Psychoanalysis would thus become available to members of all social strata.

Freud’s proclamation to start clinics did not fall on deaf ears. The number of participants who were in Budapest in late September and early October 1918 was large and reads like a “Who’s Who” in early psychoanalysis. The list included Max Eitingon, Ernst Simmel, Eduard Hitschmann, and Sandor Ferenczi, Melanie Klein, Hanns Sachs, Sandor Rado, and Karl Abraham. All were instrumental in the founding of clinics, first in Berlin, then Vienna, followed by Paris, London, and Zagreb. Elizabeth Danto discovered at least twelve of these clinics. Danto’s work provides us with up to now missing and important piece of scholarship. While some of the clinics fell victim to the Nazis by 1938, others, such as those in London and Paris still function today.

This book is much more than a history of psychoanalytic clinics. It is a history of Red Vienna during the twenty-year period from 1918 to 1938 and the relationship of psychoanalysis to the larger political movement of the time. Freud maintained close relationships with socialists, including Ernst Simmel. Some of the psychoanalysts of the period, including Erich Fromm, identified themselves as Marxists. The book includes a discussion of social programs for children born out of wedlock, the architecture of the period, including the Bauhaus school, and health-care programs other
than psychoanalysis. Attention is given to Freud’s son Ernst who, as an archi-
tect, designed the treatment rooms of the Berlin Poliklinik.

The period of Red Vienna was a time of immense optimism after World War One, even as Europe arose from ruin, and economic instability was the order of the day. Danto takes us through a year-by-year history in a readable and informative narrative. When we look at the history of the United States over the past fifty years, we find some interesting parallels. There was no time in our history more like Red Vienna than the 1960s when, with a great deal of optimism, we believed that society could rid itself of its ills. One need only remember Kennedy’s New Frontier and, even more to the point, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society to recall that the 1960s were a time when possibility and optimism were boundless. I can only wonder if it is no coincidence that the 1960s were a high point for psychoanalysis. Most psychiatrists went on for analytic training. Silvano Arieti, a psychoanalyst from the White Institute, was the author of the most widely used textbook in psychiatry.

When we look at clinics associated with analytic institutes today, two notably come to mind: the Horney Clinic and the Clinical Services at the White Institute. Both were founded in the late 1940s. Even though I have been associated with the White Clinic since 1974, I have never heard any mention of the tradition of clinics in Europe that did essentially the same thing: make psychotherapy available to all income levels of patients. At least at White, it seems that we take credit for inventing the sliding fee analytic clinic on our own. It has been extremely hard to get Institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association to start community clinics, although much credit should be given to Jon Meyer, the current President of the Association, for founding a Committee on Community Clinics to form such clinics. It could be that the decline of psychoanalysis in America is related to the elitism that Freud and the pioneers in the field so much wanted to avoid. They seemed to understand that for a method to be accepted and successful, it had to be universally available. For those of us who remember the 60s and 70s, it was the Community Psychiatry movement that first threatened the hegemony of psychoanalysis in medical residency programs and in the public view. Community psychiatry would be available to everyone, not just those who could afford treatment. President Kennedy proposed the development of Community clinics to replace the incarceration of patients in state hospitals. There was, then, an excitement in psychiatry and psychoanalysis, a feeling that we could change the world for the better. The federal government pumped money into psychiatry programs.
Unfortunately, as we know, only half of this program became a reality. The state hospitals closed, but adequate community clinics never materialized. After the failure of the Community Psychiatry clinics, psychopharmacology rose to prominence. At least it can be said that chemistry is not elitist. Pills will always be cheaper than psychoanalysis. I am wondering if psychoanalysis has “failed” because it has not been a treatment for the poor, the undereducated, even the middle class, rather than for the rich, educated, and well connected, that is, the elite.

One is left to wonder why psychoanalysis disavowed its early roots in socialism. Could it be that the Horney clinic with Karen Horney, and the White Clinic with Erich Fromm in residence did not acknowledge their ancestry in the Berlin Polyclinic or the Vienna Ambulatorium? After all, both of these luminaries were involved in the early European clinics. Was it in response to the anti-Communism of the late 40s and 50s, the McCarthy Era, that led psychoanalysis to deny its roots, its universality, and began its own suicide? Or was it some attempt to attain legitimacy within the medical establishment in the United States? The early psychoanalysts had similar struggles. One of the first state-sponsored uses of psychoanalytic clinics was in the treatment of veterans suffering from war neurosis during and after the First World War. The established medical tradition saw posttraumatic stress as malingering. Warner-Jauregg treated disabled soldiers with electric shocks to their testicles, rather than a more compassionate psychoanalytic treatment. No wonder that psychoanalysis was better received!

No less an historian than Peter Gay has complimented Danto’s work as a missing piece of the history of psychoanalysis. I am not doing justice to her scholarship in this review. Her work is the product of a laborious sifting of archival material. It contains a great deal of detailed information that I do not believe is available anywhere else. She has, for example, reproduced copies of vouchers (those of Freud himself), which the analysts could use for payment of services at the Vienna clinic. Dr. Danto is a professor of social work at Hunter College. She brings a different perspective to psychoanalysis than we psychiatrists and psychologists are accustomed to: the importance of social issues. She has written a scholarly book, and reading it will benefit us all. And maybe it will inspire us to save an increasingly irrelevant profession.